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Ever since its establishment in the 1950s, the European Union (EU)​[1]​ and its decision making processes have been source of fascination for political scientists.  Until the 1990s, a considerable proportion of the research effort was primarily directed towards an analysis of the integration mechanisms at work among member states, in creating supranational institutions at the EU level.  Accordingly, theory tended to treat the EU as something ‘above’ the member states, an entity forged from ‘bottom up’ processes flowing from the objectives and actions of national actors, such as national governments and interest groups.  Academics were interested in the relationships between national (and sub-national) actors and EU bodies, and how they participate in building the EU's political system.  For many years deliberations (see for example, Haas 1958 and Moravcsik 1998) revolved around a pivotal question that asked which actor was (or actors were) the most dominant in EU policy making.  This debate had, however, reached something of a stalemate by the mid-1980s. 

As a consequence, alternative perspectives and approaches were sought.  One such response was to turn to an exploration of the 'top-down' effects of the EU on national politics, policies and political systems.  In other words, studies began to examine the 'Europeanisation' processes at work (Héritier et al., 2001: 3).  Under this banner some scholars began to investigate the EU-effect on domestic political structures such as government departments (e.g. Bulmer and Burch 1998; Cole and Drake 2000).  Others focused on particular policy areas such as the environment (Fairbrass and Jordan 2002) and industrial policy (e.g. Fairbrass 2002; Kassim and Menon 1996; V Schmidt 1996).  A few studies examined the impact of the EU on interest groups (e.g. Lehmkuhl 2000; Cowles 2001) and political parties (Ladrech 2001).  This research advanced despite the lack of a commonly agreed definition about the notion of ‘Europeanisation’ (Radaelli, 2000).  Somewhat problematically, the term has been used to refer to at least five types of political process in the EU. It has been used in the sense referred to above, to convey the idea of a 'top-down' process.  It has also been employed to signify the creation of new governance powers and structures at the EU level (Cowles et al. 2001: 2) or to convey the idea of the EU as the point of reference for national practices and policies (Hanf and Soetendorp 1998: 1).  It can also mean the horizontal transfer of ideas, practices and norms (Burch and Gomez 2003: 2; Howell, 2003), or, lastly, may mean a two-way interaction between the EU and the national (Bomberg and Peterson 2000: 8).  

In this paper the first of the definitions referred to above is the starting point for an examination of interest representation of two sets of actors, namely business and environmental groups based in the UK.  That is, 'Europeanisation' is defined as a top-down mechanism that brings about changes in politics in the domestic arena to the extent that policies, practices and preferences are altered in response to EU initiatives and legislation.  In other words, this paper treats the EU as a catalyst for the modification of objectives and strategies (Fairbrass 2002; Fairbrass 2003a and 2003b) on the part of the business and environmental interests and helps to shape their interest representation.  In common with the others that contribute to collection, this paper draws on Bache (2004) and Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) and goes beyond the definition immediately above to extend the analysis of EU-effects along two dimensions: the direct and indirect impacts; the voluntary and coercive effects.  In other words, this paper employs a two-by-two matrix (see Figure 1) to explore the intended (direct) and unintended (indirect) effects and the unopposed and resisted effects of the EU on interest representation among UK business and environmental groups.  The matrix points to the way in which the EU sets out to directly impact on national politics and how its actions and initiatives can also have unintended consequences for some policies and actors.  More interestingly, from the point of view of these case studies, it also suggests ways in which the EU's proposals may be welcomed by some actors who embrace the changes and how it can be resisted by others who oppose the plans.

------------------------------------------insert figure 1 about here--------------------------------

The empirical findings that provide the foundations for this paper are drawn from two sources. The first is a study (Fairbrass 2002) of the Europeanisation of UK and French business interests (i.e. individual firms and trade associations), as a response to the EU's Single Market Programme and the 1987 Single European Act (particularly the market liberalisation measures and elevation of Research and Technological Development (R & TD) policy).  Given the aims of this article (i.e. to compare two sets of UK actors), the full results of the study will not be presented here.  Rather, evidence about the UK based firms will form one of the focal points of this paper.  The second source is an extensive piece of research concerned with the Europeanisation of UK environmental policy (Jordan 2002).  Given the constraints here, the results (Fairbrass and Jordan 2001a and 2001b; Jordan 2002; Fairbrass and Jordan 2002) relating to one area within the EU's environmental policy is highlighted.  That aspect is biodiversity policy and the response of UK environmental groups to the two most significant biodiversity directives (i.e. the 1979 Wild Birds Directive (WBD) and the 1992 Habitats Directive (HD)). 

These two cases were chosen because they allow a comparison between two sets of actors that were subject to a number of common conditions and forces but which were also affected by some important differences.  Crucially, both sets of actors operate within a predominantly EU regulatory (rather than distributive or re-distributive) framework.  However, there are differences: the firms have been/are affected by de-regulation, whilst the environmental sector was impacted by increasing regulation.  Crucially, both business and environmental interests are active in policy areas where the EU evidently intended to have an impact on elements of the national political arena such as policy content, the practices of particular organisations, and their preferences.  

Clearly, it must be acknowledged that businesses are subject to a very extensive array of EU legislation covering virtually all aspects of their activities (from marketing to production, from personnel issues to finance).  However, the business sectors particularly selected for study (i.e. telecommunications, electricity and gas supply, and insurance firms) were chosen because they were/are subject to the EU’s Single Market Programme and a number of its associated market liberalisation directives.  These directives regulate the supply of products and services and directly impinge on market structures in the highlighted industries.  Environmental policy also has had a strong regulatory character (although there is a move towards alternative measures such as NEPIs currently underway).  Within the broad sweep of environmental policy, biodiversity policy is an area that regulates nature conservation and directly affects the activities of public and private bodies in terms of their land use.  In both policy areas (market liberalisation and biodiversity policy) there were some actors who embraced the regulatory changes and others that opposed them.

These case studies are compared using a set of questions common to this collection of papers.  They are: What has been Europeanised and to what extent? When has Europeanisation occurred and in what sequence?  How and why has Europeanisation occurred, and through what process? Has it been largely voluntary or coercive, direct or indirect (see above)?  Has the process been predominantly top down, or has it involved more interactive, two-way processes?  Has the process of Europeanisation created an identifiable set of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in the UK, and (how) has this pattern altered over time?  Has Europeanisation had any other important effects? (e.g. on policy efficiency or effectiveness, transparency, accountability or legitimacy)?  How does the UK's experience of Europeanisation in this sector/institutional setting compare to that of other countries?  Applying these questions to interest representation in the UK and comparing the patterns associated with the two sets of actors (i.e. business and environmental) reveals interesting differences and similarities.






Traditionally, the study of interest groups and interest representation has been undertaken using one or more of a number of major political studies theories.  Among the most influential approaches to emerge since the 1950s are the contending theories of corporatism (e.g. Cawson 1978) and pluralism (e.g. Dahl 1961).  Each has given rise of a number of derivatives and offshoots, manifesting themselves, inter alia, variously as neocorporatism, policy network analysis (e.g. Richardson and Jordan 1979; Marsh and Rhodes 1992; Peterson 1992) and neopluralism.  These theories have primarily been concerned with understanding the role of pressure groups within the democratic political system (Grant 2000, 38), where the political system under investigation is typically the 'nation state'.  Attempts have also been made to utilise these theories in understanding the place of pressure groups in the European Union (EU).  For example, Neofunctionalism (e.g. Haas 1958), with its emphasis on the part played by transnational interest groups (in alliance primarily with the European Commission) represents a variant of pluralism that has focused on policy making in the EU context.  Corporatism has also been debated as an organizing framework for interest representation at the EU level (e.g. Schmitter and Lehmbruch 1979). 

These conceptualizations offer different accounts of the role of pressure groups and pose fundamental questions about the dispersal or concentration of power within any given political system and the relative ease or difficulty of access for groups to policy makers (i.e. the degree of openness/exclusivity of the relationship between government and the groups).  In brief, pluralism, for example, tends to regard power as being relatively widely dispersed so that no single group can dominate all aspects of life. Corporatism sees particular groups as developing a close relationship with government (i.e. employers and employees groups).  Neopluralism concludes that it is business interests have a particularly privileged position in the political system (Smith 1990, 315).  Whilst these different approaches arrive at significantly different assessments of the role of pressure groups in a political system, they tend to share a common interest in questioning the degree of influence achieved by various pressure groups, generally measured in terms of the groups' ability to affect policy. 

Europeanisation
This paper departs from these traditional approaches to the study of interest representation by examining it using the lens of Europeanisation and the two-by-two matrix outlined in the introduction to this paper. Europeanisation is conceived of as the reorientation or reshaping of aspects of politics in the domestic arena in ways that reflect the policies, practices and preferences of European level actors, as advanced through EU initiatives and decisions.  As a result, rather than asking about the role in or impact on a political system of business and environmental interests, as have the traditional approaches outlined above, the Europeanisation perspective leads to the opposite questions.  How have external forces impacted on the interest groups, such as firms and the environmental groups?  Were the effects direct or indirect?  Were they embraced or resisted?  As a result, the paper is more specifically concerned with the ways in which changes originating in the broader political system at the EU level have affected salient policy content from the point of view of the two sets of interests (i.e. market liberalisation for the firms and biodiversity policy for the environmental groups).  It is also concerned with the ways in which the EU has impacted on the practices and preferences of the firms and the environmental groups.

Reviewing the firms and the environmental groups more closely this paper considers how the EU has impacted on a number of specific aspects of their interest representation.  The data collected and presented here suggests that the EU has affected the following elements of the interest representation behaviour or the firms and the environmental groups.  It has impacted on who or what is targeted by the interests and the means by which they engage in interest representation (in terms of internal resources such as knowledge, finances, staffing and alliance building).  The EU has affected the firms' and environmental groups' political objectives and their reasons for lobbying who they lobby.  The obvious, but fundamental, point to bear in mind is that for interests such as businesses and environmental groups alike, the absence of the EU would mean that the actors would have a smaller choice of political targets.  A less extensive range of targets, in turn, would be likely to affect their choice of contact routes and allies.  In effect the existence of the EU's political system offers additional and/or alternative policy making venues, conduits, and partners.  In other words, the EU affects the political opportunity structures (Kitschelt 1986) available to interest groups.  It is argued (Fairbrass 2003) that whether these opportunities are exploited, or not, amounts to a strategic decision and depends on the internal objectives and resources of the interest groups.  In summary, Europeanisation is a process that can impact on all of these dimensions of interest representation.  The paper now turns to a closer examination of each of the sets of actors, taking the business organisations first.

CASE STUDY 1: UK BUSINESS INTERESTS
The findings analysed and summarised here form part of a wider study on the Europeanisation of business interests (Fairbrass 2002, 2003a, 2003b and 2004).  In total, the research examined three industrial sectors in two countries: firms in the telecoms, energy (gas and electricity) and insurance sectors based in the UK and France.  These industries and countries were selected for particular examination owing to the significant similarities and differences in relation to the EU's Single Market Programme and its attendant market liberalisation directives​[2]​. The study explored their relationships with national and EU level policy makers, along with their interaction with intermediaries such as national level trade associations and European wide groups. 

What has been Europeanised and to what extent?
The data collected suggests that policy content (i.e. market liberalisation) had been Europeanised extensively and significantly. During the period from the mid-1980s through to the late 1990s, the EU proposed and introduced tens of Directives concerned with de-regulating the markets for telecommunications, gas, electricity and insurance services and products that substantially altered the character of those markets.  During the same period the practices and preferences of the businesses studied were also modified.  They reoriented their interest representation so as to target of EU policy makers among firms in addition to UK government.  They established EU-level trade associations to act as a lobbying conduit to the EU.  They built on existing alliances with other actors, such as the UK Government, in order to sustain pressure on the Commission and other EU institutions so that the EU would keep up is momentum with regard to the de-regulation of markets for telecoms, energy and insurance products and services.  They created new alliances with the Commission against other countervailing actors such as trade unions in the UK and hostile member state governments and firms in other countries (e.g. France, Belgium and even Germany).  These changes can be seen as a major development from pre-1980s patterns of governance.  In summary, the EU significantly affected policy content and the interest representation practices and preferences of the UK based business organisations.

When has Europeanisation occurred and in what sequence?
The development of the Europeanisation of the policy area is marked by three main stages.  In the 1950s the EU attempted to create a single market but failed to do so in these industries.  Little change was achieved at the EU level until the 1980s.  Market liberalisation of these three industries was accomplished in the UK earlier than at the EU level: the UK undertook a major privatisation and market liberalisation programme in the UK under the Conservative Government, starting in the early 1980s.   This programme directly affected telecommunications, energy and insurance.  Subsequently, the EU renewed its efforts.  From mid 1980s onwards the EU introduced the 1987 Single European Act and the Single Market Programme (with its formal 1992 deadline).  Associated with these policy changes at the UK and EU level were alterations to the interest representation objectives, strategies and actions of the UK firms.  Changes in lobbying patterns tended to mirror the changes in the policy development.  The UK firms began to target the EU policy makers once privatisation and market liberalisation had occurred in the UK, in order to "encourage" the EU to follow the same path.  As soon as market liberalisation directives were beginning to be formulated at the EU level in the mid to late 1980s, the UK firms increasingly switched their lobbying to EU level targets, using EU routes (via Euro-groups), the UK Government​[3]​ and through direct contact with EU level policy makers in the Commission and the Parliament.  

How and why has Europeanisation occurred, and through what process? 
The Europeanisation of the policy area (i.e. Single Market) represented for the UK firms a case of direct voluntary Europeanisation.  This shaped, and was shaped by, the interest representation of the firms in the three sectors.  They welcomed the policy change, as did their industrial customers and the UK Government.  It represented a case of coercion for those groups that opposed the Directives, such as the trade unions in the UK (and France) who acted on behalf of the employees in the telecoms and energy industries (less so the insurance sector, which was in any case less unionised).  See  Figure 2.

----------------------------insert Figure 2 about here ---------------------------------------------

Looking at the interest representation among the UK firms in the round, it has not simply been a case of 'top-down' Europeanisation.  Rather it is at least a 2-way interaction.  The UK firms exerted considerable upward pressure, in combination with their allies.  Simultaneously, there was some downward from the EU on the UK firms and government with regard to some of the fine detail of the market liberalisation directives.  Looking beyond the UK case study, it is also possible to argue that there has been some horizontal pressure as the UK uploaded its ideas about market structures were transferred upwards to the EU, and these were then downloaded forcibly on firms (and Governments) in other member (e.g. France).

Has the process of Europeanisation created an identifiable set of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in Britain, and (how) has this pattern altered over time?
As a consequence of these patterns it can be argued that there are both 'winners' and 'losers'.  The winners included the UK firms and the UK Government who succeeded in achieving their objectives with regard to EU market liberalisation.  The Commission too could also be considered to be a winner in the same respect.  By contrast those groups opposed to market liberalisation (e.g. UK trade unions and initially French firms/Government) failed in resisting the regulatory changes and were forced to adapt to and adopt the EU's market liberalisation regime.  They can therefore be classified as 'losers'.

Has Europeanisation had any other important effects? (e.g. on policy efficiency or effectiveness, transparency, accountability or legitimacy)?
The altered market structures and patterns of ownership in the sectors studied permitted new suppliers/producers/manufacturers to enter the markets.  These new players were anxious to establish relationships with EU policy makers but in many cases lacked sufficient resources in order to make direct contact.  As a result the new entrants tended to rely on the Euro groups in their sector to act as their spokesperson.  This had the knock-on effect of strengthening what had been relatively weak European-wide interest groups.  This also led the large dominant firms in these industrial sectors to re-assess the value of the Euro-groups and resulted in the large firms taking on leading roles within them.  In addition, it meant that the European Commission re-evaluated the Euro-groups (previously the Commission had seen them as too weak to be of much help in policy making) giving them more attention and credence.  In other words, EU level policy change that led to associated changes to the configuration of the policy actors, and also led to changes in the interest representation practices and preferences of the firms.

It should also be noted that the patterns of interest representation surrounding the firms with regard to market liberalisation directives raised questions about the transparency and legitimacy of the policy making.  The firms certainly appeared to have a close relationship with policy makers at the EU and the national level. At the same time, other groups such as the trade unions were broadly marginalised by or excluded from the decisions making process.

Where appropriate, how does Britain’s experience of Europeanisation in your sector/institutional setting compare to that of other countries?
There are clear differences between the Europeanisation of the interest representation of UK based business organisations and the firms in the same industries in other countries.  The privatisation programme initiated in the UK in advance of many other EU member states and the EU itself, gave the UK based firms both the autonomy and incentives to lobby the EU to adopt market liberalisation directives.  The UK firms accordingly made strenuous efforts to establish strong, direct contacts with the Commission and the European Parliament.  By contrast (Fairbrass 2003a) the French based firms were somewhat hindered by their public ownership and management by the French state, and so during the early stages of the EU's market liberalisation programme had little freedom or motivation to build relationships with the EU institutions on the subject of market liberalisation. That said, it should be recognised that the French firms were very active with regard to lobbying with regard to R & TD funding in the EU and had extremely strong connections with DG Research, where at the time of the study the DG was headed by a French Commissioner (i.e. Cresson).  Later as the French firms began to appreciate the commercial value of market liberalisation (having observed the commercial benefits of market liberalisation for the UK firms).  Combined with some softening of the French government's hostility towards market liberalisation, the French firms did, indeed, begin to establish links with the EU institutions with a view to influencing and pursuing market liberalisation measures.  The French firms found themselves in the position of trying to convince the French government of the merits of market liberalisation.

CASE STUDY 2: ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS
The findings presented here form part of a broader study (Jordan 2002; Fairbrass and Jordan 2001a and 2001b) of the Europeanisation of environmental policy.  The data summarised here is confined to those environmental groups concerned with biodiversity policy and two key nature conservation directives (the 1979 Wild Birds Directive and the 1992 Habitats Directive).

What has been Europeanised and to what extent?
The content of national biodiversity policy has been significantly Europeanised.  The two central directives referred to above introduced major changes to the legislation at the EU level, and at the national level in the regulation of species and habitats. The proposed alterations to EU regulation, when both the WBD and the HD were being formulated also led to modifications in the practices and preferences of the environmental groups.  Facing substantial barriers at the national level (Fairbrass and Jordan 2001a) in achieving their aims of introducing tougher controls over land use and species protection, the environmental groups recognised that political opportunities were available at the EU level.  They began to actively target EU policy makers, from the 1970s onwards, in preference to the UK government, once they realised that the EU was about to embark on a programme of reform of biodiversity policy.  They also engaged in alliance building with other environmental groups at national and EU level.  They successfully established coalitions with EU bodies, such as the Commission and especially the Parliament, and exploited the power of the ECJ against UK government, landowning groups, and hunting/shooting groups.  This contrasts significantly from the business interest case set out above where the firms could ally both with the national government and the EU institutions against other opponents, whilst the environmental groups allied with the EU bodies against the UK government (and others).

When has Europeanisation occurred and in what sequence?
Biodiversity protection legislation or agreements were initiated in the 1950s, at the wider international level in advance of changes at the EU and national level.  International conventions then combined with citizen pressure to produce changes in the EU policy during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s.  The EU's directives on species and habitats protection were introduced in 1979 and 1992 respectively.  In both cases (i.e. the WBD and the HD) these policy and legal alterations preceded the amendments to UK law.  The UK trailed the EU by adopting the Wildlife and Countryside Act in 1981 (two years after the WBD) and created regulations in the UK on habitats to transpose the HD in 1994 (again two years later than the EU).

As with the UK business interest case described above, the initiation of law changes at the EU level prompted activity on the part of the UK environmental groups.  In common with the business organisations, the UK environmental groups were pro-active not passive.  They sought to influence and target EU level policy makers, in order to achieve their policy objectives.  They worked in alliance with other environmental groups especially those with a European presence (e.g. WWF had an office in Brussels and the RSPB worked via the Brussels based BirdLife International).  The UK based and Brussels based groups also marshalled national groups in other EU member states to support their campaigns to strengthen biodiversity protection.  In other words, the impact of the EU's initiatives on interest representation was to provoke the groups into alliance building and activity at the EU level, rather than expending "wasted effort" trying to influence national level policy makers.

How and why has Europeanisation occurred, and through what process? 
The Europeanisation of the policy area (i.e. biodiversity) was the product of both top-down and bottom up pressures.  The UK based groups, in an upward direction, pressurised the EU to introduce tighter nature conservation measures and the EU, in turn, coerced the UK (and many other EU member states) to adopt the WBD and the HD.  The EU exerted downward pressure on national level public (i.e. central and local government) and private bodies (such as farmers).  The biodiversity directives were supported and welcomed by the environmental groups.  See Figure 3.  Equally, the new measures were opposed and resisted by national government, land owning interest groups, and hunting/shooting groups. As with the business interest case above, the Europeanisation of the policy area led to or was accompanied by the Europeanisation of the interest representation behaviour of the environmental groups.

Has the process of Europeanisation created an identifiable set of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in Britain, and (how) has this pattern altered over time?
If winning and losing are measured in terms of whether a given actor achieved its policy objectives, then the environmental groups were 'winners' and the UK government, landowners and the hunting/shooting groups were 'losers'.  The environmental groups succeeded in raising nature conservation protection standards.  The opponents of the directives (i.e. the UK Government, the land owning and the hunting/shooting groups) failed to prevent the introduction of the measures.

Has Europeanisation had any other important effects? (e.g. on policy efficiency or effectiveness, transparency, accountability or legitimacy)?
As with the previous case (i.e. the business interests), this case study raises important questions about transparency and legitimacy.  The environmental groups achieved a close relationship with the Commission and the Parliament.  The groups opposed to higher nature conservation standards found themselves marginalised at the EU level.  For example, hunting groups complained that they had not been sufficiently consulted on the proposed legal changes at the EU level.  

A second interesting point about this case study is that it contains a clear example of policy spillover.  As part of the drive to implement the EU directives, pressure was exerted via a related policy area.  That is, regional policy and the funding measures associated with it were used to compel governments to implement the WBD and the HD (or at least the threat of withheld funding was used to coerce the governments).  This could be seen as a part of a wider 'greening' of regional policy.

Where appropriate, how does Britain’s experience of Europeanisation in your sector/institutional setting compare to that of other countries?




The starting point for this paper is that traditional approaches to the study of interest representation offer a partial or incomplete picture of the political processes at work.  Whilst they draw attention to the roles played by interest groups in a political system and examine their impact on a polity, the traditional theories fail to sufficiently consider some other mechanisms in operation.  The Europeanisation framework helps to address this lacuna by raising questions about the impact of political systems on national politics, policies and practices including the impact on interest representation.  Europeanisation, in particular, poses questions about the effect of the EU on interest groups.

This paper sets out by adopting a definition that treats Europeanisation as a top-down process and it utilities a two-by-two matrix that goes beyond this simple definition.  The matrix invites a consideration of two further questions.  Does Europeanisation impact on national politics and political systems in a direct or indirect manner?  Is its impact voluntary or coercive?  Using such an approach, this paper has examined the impact of the EU on the interest representation of two contrasting sets of national actors: namely, UK businesses and environmental groups.

The research undertaken and analysed here clearly shows that the EU has affected the content of the policy that concerns the two groups of actors (i.e. market liberalisation and biodiversity policy) and that is accompanied by alterations to the practices and preferences of the two sets of actors.  Both the business and environmental groups have treated the EU as a new set of political opportunities. In both cases, the firms and the environmental groups have reoriented their objectives and strategies to target EU level policy makers, make use of European lobbying routes and establishing European lobbying partners or allies.  There are, however, some critical differences.  For the business actors the EU represents an additional range of targets, lobbying routes and allies.  For the environmental groups the EU is important for their political objectives because the EU offers an alternative set of venues, conduits and coalitions. 

These patterns are a manifestation of the extent to which EU initiatives in the two policy sectors (i.e. market liberalisation and biodiversity policy) are welcomed or rejected by the firms and other policy actors involved in the sector.  For example, with regard to market liberalisation, the EU's proposals in this area were embraced (actively sought) by both the firms and the UK government.  They were opposed by other interest groups (e.g. trade unions) that were relatively marginalised by the national and EU political decision making processes.  This had a direct impact on the possible alliances and channels open to the firms.  Conversely, for the environmental groups, they were the interest groups that were largely excluded from national policy making but heavily consulted by the EU.  As a result of these factors, the UK environmental groups allied themselves against the UK government and built coalitions with the European Commission and Parliament.  The conclusion that can be drawn is that political objectives are very significant in determining whether an EU initiative will be opposed or embraced.  

It is also important to reflect on the way in which these two case studies point to the issue about whether Europeanisation is a top-down, bottom-up, horizontal or two-way process.  What these two cases, perhaps, highlight is the salience of timing and phasing.  In the business organisations case there was an element of bottom-up mechanisms in operation.  Both the UK government and UK firms attempted and broadly succeeded in upload their preferred policy options to the EU level.  This was a result of the UK being in advance of the UK is this policy area.  This, however, was not the end of the process.  The EU then downloaded market liberalisation to other member states in the three industrial sectors, facing resistance in the process.  In effect, therefore, Europeanisation is a two-way and can be a three-way process, when ideas from one member state are transferred to others via the EU.  Similar patterns are also apparent with regard to biodiversity policy.  However, in this case the environmental groups formed part of a coalition that created a new regulatory framework in advance of changes in the UK's legislation and this resulted in EU policy being forcibly being downloaded on to the UK government.  Such factors were highly important is shaping the interest representation of both the firms and the environmental groups.
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Figure 1: Different Types of Europeanisation of policy areas
	Voluntary	Coercive
Direct	Intended impact of an EU initiative unopposed by dominant Member State actors	Intended impact of an EU initiative opposed by dominant Member State Actors




Figure 2: Business Interest Representation

	Voluntary	Coercive
Direct	Producers/suppliers and UK government - positive towards market liberalisation.Large consumers of liberalised services supported market liberalisation	Government and firms in other member states e.g. FranceCountervailing groups – Trade Unions in the UK





Figure 3: UK Environmental Interests
	Voluntary	Coercive
Direct	Environmental groups - gained leverage against the actors coerced by EU legislation	UK government obliged to comply with EU Wild Birds and Habitats DirectivesUK businesses  (e.g. farmers, forestry, port authorities, other land owners) obliged to comply with EU Wild Birds and Habitats DirectivesCountervailing groups e.g. hunting and shooting clubs obliged to comply with EU Wild Birds and Habitats Directives
Indirect	Affected other policy areas e.g. greening of regional policy	
















^1	  Whilst recognising that the polity now called the European Union did not begin its existence with this label, the term European Union is used throughout this paper.
^2	  All three industries were subject to EU market liberalisation, although those firms in the UK had undergone the process earlier than the French firms.
^3	  The UK Government represented an ally to the firms is their pursuit of market liberalisation objectives.  Both the firms and the Government exhibited a positive stance towards market de-regulation.
